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Transparency: An Overused but Underanalyzed Concept?
Transparency is a key concept of our times. The need for transparency is rou-
tinely invoked in areas as diverse as human rights, monetary policy and security,
as well as the environment. Transparency as a moral and political imperative is
closely associated with goals such as accountable, inclusive, legitimate and dem-
ocratic governance. Yet, while these latter concepts have been subjected to much
scrutiny, it is striking how under-analyzed the notion of transparency remains,
particularly in writings within global environmental politics.
The few scholars who have written explicitly about transparency in the
global environmental realm have discussed the concept in relation to informa-
tion ºows about state behavior in complying with international environmental
regimes. The central claim is that states need to be transparent about their
behavior as a way to enhance regime effectiveness.1 Yet transparency as a key po-
litical project goes beyond this. There is a compelling need to investigate the
growing pervasiveness of the call for transparency in global environmental gov-
ernance, one which extends beyond state-led international environmental re-
gimes to private and market-based governance as well.2 In addition, the as-
sumed link between transparency and legitimate and democratic governance—
not only effective governance—requires more critical scrutiny. It is timely, I ar-
gue, to explore the nature and implications of a transparency turn in global en-
vironmental governance.
I focus in this article on information disclosure as one concrete operation-
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alization of transparency in the global environmental domain. In a domestic
context, information disclosure has been described as a third wave in environ-
mental governance, termed “regulation by revelation” by Florini.3 Arguably,
such a third wave is becoming ever more important in the global environmental
realm as well. Moreover, it extends beyond state-led regulation-by-revelation to
include a range of private information disclosure initiatives.
A growing variety of such “governance-by-disclosure” initiatives can be
identiªed in the global environmental domain. These include the Aarhus Con-
vention on access to environmental information4 as well as a range of prior in-
formed consent-based treaties governing global ºows of pesticides, hazardous
waste, biodiversity or genetically modiªed organisms. Private eco-labeling
schemes in forestry, ªsheries or organic food are also based upon information
disclosure, as are various corporate social responsibility-related voluntary initia-
tives, including the Global Reporting Initiative (calling for sustainability report-
ing by private corporations) or the NGO-led Publish What You Pay initiative
(calling for disclosure of revenue earnings by extractive industries operating in
resource-rich developing countries). Information disclosure is also central to
NGO-led and other efforts to enhance accountability of international organiza-
tions, such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization.
Each of these initiatives has been much analyzed in its own right and from
a variety of perspectives. Viewed through a governance-by-disclosure lens, they
vary in multiple ways, including who is pushing for disclosure, about what,
from whom, and to what end. As a cursory glance at these initiatives reveals,
there are now multiple architects and promoters of transparency in global gov-
ernance, and the normative rationales underpinning the growing call for trans-
parency differ greatly—not least depending upon whether information disclo-
sure is state-induced and mandatory, or privately initiated and voluntary. With
diverse rationales for disclosure (for example, these could range from improving
state-led mandatory regulation to avoiding state-led mandatory regulation), the
implications for accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness of “governance-by-
disclosure” will differ. If so, rather than taking it for granted, the claim that
transparency is an essential and unproblematic handmaiden to legitimate, dem-
ocratic and effective governance requires critical scrutiny.
But if governance-by-disclosure initiatives vary along multiple dimen-
sions, what might they have in common? I argue here that, notwithstanding dif-
ferences, two core assumptions link such governance-by-disclosure initiatives,
but that both of these assumptions need to be subjected to critical scrutiny via
comparative analysis. This can illuminate the promise and perils of relying on
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transparency as a tool in global environmental governance, and the nature, ex-
tent and implications of a transparency turn in this domain.
The two assumptions relate, ªrst, to the procedural nature of governance-
by-disclosure initiatives and second, to the central role of information therein.
In the ªrst instance, all governance-by-disclosure initiatives reºect a “procedural
turn” in environmental governance. Underlying this is the assumption that pro-
cess matters and “getting the process right” can achieve desired results. Second,
all governance-by-disclosure initiatives share the assumption that information
matters and information can empower. I discuss each in turn.
Governance-by-Disclosure: The Power of Process?
Governance-by-disclosure is concerned with establishing procedures (for infor-
mation generation, dissemination, accessibility or usability) instead of mandat-
ing speciªc outcomes. The assumption is that agreeing upon procedures will
contribute to attaining desired (and also largely procedural) goals. An example
is the concept of prior informed consent that underpins global regimes govern-
ing trade in risky substances. The goal of information disclosure—about poten-
tial risks posed by these substances—is to permit recipient countries to make in-
formed decisions, without specifying whether those decisions should be to ban,
restrict or permit trade in the regulated substances. The Aarhus Convention is
another example of a procedural turn in environmental governance. It is one of
the ªrst conventions to focus on establishing procedures for access to informa-
tion, participation and justice, rather than on specifying outcomes in a given en-
vironmental area. Similarly, eco-labeling schemes are premised on the belief
that disclosing information about processes and practices of sustainable re-
source use will empower consumers to take decisions, without specifying what
these decisions should be.
There is much promise in such a procedural turn. In its non-patronizing
approach (it does not presume to mandate outcomes or tell the governed what
to do), it is progressive and potentially emancipatory. Process is receiving ever
more attention in the context of global debates over accountable, legitimate and
democratic multi-actor and multi-level governance, including in the environ-
mental domain. It has long been central to participation debates, for example,
with much attention devoted to devising innovative procedures to enhance citi-
zen involvement in environmental decision-making. Analyses of legitimacy,
likewise, include distinctions such as input, output and throughput legitimacy,
with both input and throughput legitimacy being essentially procedural.5 Pro-
cess is also at the center of long-standing debates about direct and deliberative
democracy. Largely within legal writings, a “proceduralisation of environmental
regulation” is becoming a staple of debate,6 with notions such as procedural en-
vironmental rights,7 including the right to information, gaining ground as “con-
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stitutive principles” of environmental governance.8 Is transparency becoming a
constitutive principle of global environmental governance as well? My conten-
tion here is that governance-by-disclosure initiatives provide another rich set of
examples through which to examine the implications of a procedural turn in
global environmental governance.
And if so, while the promise of process is clear, the perils require analysis
as well. A variety of potential perils can be analyzed through comparative study
of governance-by-disclosure initiatives. One peril might be that “getting the pro-
cess right” becomes a distraction, diverting time and resources from substantive
outcomes that could be the focus of governance instead. Another is that proce-
dures are left vague and open to interpretation, with little recourse left for in-
tended beneªciaries who might disagree with dominant interpretations.
A third is that processes, once agreed, are subverted by those with the
power to deny their original intent. One way to do so is to provide too much—
rather than too little—of a good thing. In the realm of transparency, this could
take the form of drowning in disclosure, if recipients bombarded with large vol-
umes of disclosed information do not know how to ªnd the “needle in the hay-
stack” or even what to look for. This can be seen, for example, in governance of
genetically modiªed organisms (GMOs) in South Africa, where civil society
groups concerned about environmental impacts and relying on national right-
to-know laws receive carton-loads of risk assessment and related information,
but lack sufªcient capacity or expertise to use it in holding state and private ac-
tors accountable.9 Globally, mandatory disclosure of GMO-related information
(by exporting countries and the private sector), as required by the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, is susceptible to similar hazards. In such cases, the perils
of a procedural turn can also undermine the emancipatory potential of infor-
mation, the second key assumption underpinning governance-by-disclosure.
Governance-by-Disclosure: Empowerment through Information?
Transparency is premised on the notion that information matters and that in-
formation can empower. Empowerment necessarily implies a change in the na-
ture of existing power relationships between actors. But under what conditions
and in what ways can information empower? This question is of increasing rele-
vance to a variety of policy domains, national and international. While writings
within global environmental politics have devoted much attention to the power
of knowledge and ideas in governance, and to the relationship between science
and politics, information as a more general category remains relatively under-
analyzed.
In considering the emancipatory potential of information, the insights of
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science and technology studies are very pertinent. As scholars in this tradition
have long argued, information (including scientiªc information) is neither
value-neutral nor universally valid, and thus information alone is not likely to
resolve normative and political conºicts.10 In governance of controversial global
environmental challenges such as the spread of genetically modiªed organisms
or climate change, agreeing on what is “more and better” information, i.e. on
the scope and content of transparency, is itself a main site of conºict.
As one example, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety calls for the “advance
informed agreement” of an importing country prior to trade in certain geneti-
cally modiªed organisms. In this disclosure-based governance arrangement, the
framing of the problem is contested, the scope of information to be shared by
exporting countries and the private sector is contested, and the capacity to ac-
cess, interpret and use disclosed information is unequally distributed or ab-
sent.11 This example suggests that analyzing the emancipatory potential of infor-
mation requires analyzing conºicts over the source and nature of disclosed in-
formation, differing perceptions of its accessibility, usability, affordability and
comprehensibility, and the political and cultural context within which disclo-
sure occurs. It also highlights that mandatory disclosure (in this case about
GMO risks) might face procedural and other perils similar to voluntary disclo-
sure, where one might more readily expect disclosed information to be less-
than-empowering. Thus the example also suggests that claims about differences
between mandatory versus voluntary disclosure require careful case-by-case
analysis.
Recent scholarship within global environmental politics on “information
as inºuence” highlights that not only the credibility (perceived soundness) but
also the salience (perceived relevance) and legitimacy (perceived fairness) of
scientiªc information is key to its inºuence.12 Such research is promising, espe-
cially if extended to other categories of information as well, and if supple-
mented by insights from writings within, for example, environmental sociology,
which emphasize conditions under which informational governance may stim-
ulate environmental reform.13
More generally, the emancipatory potential of information has received at-
tention from scholars writing about transparency in other issue-areas, disci-
plines and in a national context, from which fruitful lessons can be drawn and
the phenomenon placed in a broader context. Engaging with some of this litera-
ture will certainly be necessary in assessing the role of transparency in global en-
vironmental governance. For example, recent writings of Archon Fung, Mary
Graham and David Weil have addressed conditions under which “targeted
transparency” (their term for information disclosure in speciªed issue-areas, as
opposed to general right-to-know disclosure) is effective as a policy tool. They
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argue that for information to be effective, it has to become “doubly embedded”
in the decision choices of information users and disclosers, which, in their view,
is no easy task. For our purposes, it would be useful to see how such ªndings
bear upon the question not only of effectiveness but also of empowerment as
related to information disclosure.14 Finally, disclosure and empowerment have
to be considered in light of the growing role played by new powerful intermedi-
aries, such as veriªers and certiªers of disclosed information.
Scrutinizing a Transparency Turn in Global Environmental Governance
In sum, I argue here for subjecting the concept of transparency in global envi-
ronmental politics to greater scrutiny. One way to do so is through comparative
analysis of governance-by-disclosure initiatives, in order to examine the work-
ings in practice of the two idealized assumptions pertaining to process and in-
formation that link them.
How might this be done? Future comparative research can distinguish be-
tween the multitude of global environmental governance-by-disclosure initia-
tives along a number of dimensions. Various typologies of such initiatives can
be constructed, which differentiate among them according to, ªrst, who dis-
closes information. Those most often called upon to disclose information in the
global context are states, the private sector or international organizations. A sec-
ond dimension is to whom information is disclosed. Here the possibilities in-
clude: state to state disclosure, state to citizen disclosure, private sector to state
disclosure, or private sector to consumer/citizen disclosure. A third dimension is
disclosure about what. This can include disclosure about toxic emissions or
other aspects of environmental quality, decision-making processes and out-
comes, or revenue payments. A fourth dimension is disclosure to meet what ends.
These include enhanced accountability of those disclosing information, or en-
hanced participation or enhanced choice by recipients of disclosure. Additional
dimensions include: whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory and whether
disclosed information is standardized or non-standardized.
Given such variations, comparative analysis of governance-by-disclosure
initiatives can shed more light on the power of a procedural turn and the
emancipatory potential of information in global environmental governance.
Both are likely to vary across different initiatives, given that the normative ratio-
nale to embrace transparency as a tool of governance will vary, depending upon
who is required (or chooses) to disclose what information to whom and why.
Although such normative differences will be embedded in existing power rela-
tionships, the important question is whether and how a promotion of transpar-
ency, and its workings in practice, reconstitute (or not) such power relation-
ships. Comparative analysis addressing this can illuminate, I believe, the nature
and implications of a transparency turn in global environmental governance
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and its link to accountable, legitimate and effective governance. In doing so, it
can also illuminate whether and how transparency as a constitutive principle is
transforming the institutions and practices of global environmental governance.
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